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Abstract The author seeks to set out a criticism of the alleged innovations brought about by the 
1939 Italian law on the “Protection of objects of artistic or historical value”. The law came in those 
years during which Fascist authorities struggled to keep on national soil a great deal of cultural prop-
erty, which belonged to those who were trying to flee Italy following the harshening of persecutory 
regulations. Yet, scores of valuable public and private works of art had been reaching Nazi top brass 
following the Italian government’s own initiative. This eventually hindered the legitimacy of part of 
the cultural restitutions granted to Italy by the Allied military authorities after 1945.
Summary 1 Why to Discuss a 1939 Law After Eighty Years. A premise. – 2 Historical Notes for an 
Appraisal of the Measure. – 2.1 Political Collusion and the Art Market (1933-43). – 2.2 Jewish-owned 
Cultural Property. – 3 Effects on the Application of International Law on Cultural Restitution after 
1945. – 4 Final Remarks. Demystifying Law no. 1089.
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1 Why to Discuss a 1939 Law After Eighty Years. A premise
Part I of this volume takes into account the multifaceted factors that have 
and continue to threaten cultural property worldwide. Previously, the topic 
was investigated during the first session of the international conference 
held in Venice in 2015. In the wake of this initiative, it seemed worth 
retracing the somewhat controversial dawn of the current Italian legisla-
tion on protection of cultural property, beginning with Law no. 1089 of 1 
June 1939, which is indeed the cornerstone upon which the subsequent 
legislation was built. 
The 1939 measure stems from a broader reform within the Italian ad-
ministration that Giuseppe Bottai – Fascist Ministry of National Education 
– carried out in the 1930s. From these origins, Law no. 1089 is both one of 
the founding principles of current art legislation and a genuine legacy of 
the Fascist dictatorship. This twofold nature has inspired a (re)considera-
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tion of the measure, which has gained new perspectives thanks to the de-
bate fostered by this volume. Following the establishment of the first Ital-
ian Republic in 1946, Bottai’s reforms remained formally and substantially 
untouched for over four decades.1 The Veltroni-Melandri Consolidated Act 
can be regarded as a long-awaited attempt at harmonisation. Neverthe-
less, both Law no. 1089’s structure and language would stand intact (Cosi 
2008). Indeed, Law no. 352/1997 had the Veltroni-Melandri being nothing 
more than a “formal and substantial coordination”, a “reorganisation” 
and “simplification of proceedings”.2 Owing to a literal reproduction of 
the 1939 provisions, the Veltroni-Melandri Consolidated Act appears not 
to have been able to substantially improve the matter, thus driving Bottai 
Law, its formulations and principles, well beyond the end of the twentieth 
century (Sciullo 2000).
After Bottai’s reforms, a major innovation took place on 22 January 
2004 with the adoption of the Urbani’s Code.3 Its key new features lie in 
the solutions given by the Code to previous administrative and procedural 
issues affecting cultural protection and preservation (Cosi 2008). For in-
stance, one measure was meant to regulate antiques and second-hand 
property trade (arts. 63 and 64), while another modified cultural property 
circulation and restitution provisions according to current European and 
international guidelines (arts. 64bis-87bis). Nevertheless, there is a clear 
resemblance between Urbani’s Code and its Fascist ancestor, based on its 
wording and content alike.4 Moreover, it took four years for Bottai’s law to 
be abrogated after the entry into force of the 2004 Code.5 Yet, even if the 
long-standing Fascist law was eventually put aside, cultural legislation in 
Italy largely still recalls those original statues. Even now, private and pub-
1 Law 1089/39 has not faced any relevant amendment, except for the harmonisation 
of provisions regarding export procedures with the new EU agreements on free move-
ment of goods. See Law 8 August 1972, no. 487 (http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/
N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1972-08-08;487!vig=), following the ECtHR ruling of 10 Decem-
ber 1968 (Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, 7/68, in Racc., 562 
ff) (2017-12-15).
2 Law 8 October 1997, no. 352, “Disposizioni sui beni culturali”. Gazzetta Ufficiale, 243, 
17 October 1997 (s.o. 212).
3 Gazzetta Ufficiale, no. 45, 24 febbraio 2004 (s.o. 28/L).
4 Indeed, Part Two, Title I of the Code was drafted based on a scheme laid out by Fascist 
lawmakers. After outlining the object of their dictates, Urbani’s Code and Law no. 1089 
both begin with those provisions regarding the preservation and protection of art objects, 
then moving on to the regulation of sales and exports. In the 1939 and the 2004 texts alike, 
chapters on archaeological findings follow right after. The 2004 Code frees itself from the 
old structure only later on, through its new insights on public access to and enhancement 
of CH (Title II, Part Two).
5 D.L. 22 December 2008, no. 200, “Misure urgenti in materia di semplificazione norma-
tiva”. Also Law 18 February 2009, no. 9. Gazzetta Ufficiale, 42, 20 February 2009.
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lic objects of art, as well as some places of natural relevance, are subject 
to a regime of special protection based in Law no. 1089. This is the reason 
why political and historical circumstances surrounding the drafting and 
approval of Bottai’s provisions deserve renewed attention.
2 Historical Notes for an Appraisal of the Measure
2.1 Political Collusion and the Art Market (1933-43)
Almost ten years after the March on Rome and the inception of the Grand 
Council of Fascism, Mussolini’s and Hitler’s governments chose contem-
porary art as a launchpad for their renewed ties. On 14 February 1933 – a 
few days before the Reichstag fire and the Nazi Party’s dictatorial takeover 
– the Kronprinzenpalais in Berlin inaugurated the exhibition Neue Italieni-
sche Meister. The Italian ambassador Vittorio Cerruti presided along with 
the president of the German Parliament and interim minister of Prussia, 
Hermann Göring. The latter took the opportunity in his opening remarks 
to recall a long-standing cultural and political brotherhood between the 
two governments. 
Interestingly, the selected exhibits were merely the first example of 
many unequal cultural ‘exchanges’ Nazi leaders were particularly keen on 
throughout their two decades of power. On this occasion, Italy presented 
claims for the return of a national masterpiece by Francesco Paolo Michet-
ti, Iorio’s daughter (1895). Eventually, its government ended up paying a 
considerable amount of money to the Nationalgalerie where the painting 
had been displayed since 1906. With this sum (36,000 Reichsmark) the 
Berlin gallery purchased several Italian and German works. As a result, 
Germany received fifteen pieces by renowned representatives of the Italian 
avant-garde, including Funi and Sironi, Severini, Modigliani, De Chirico 
and Carrà, in exchange for the price of a single piece of artwork (Scholz, 
Obenaus 2015).6 In May 1939, when the Pact of Steel definitively led Italy 
into the tragic path of Hitler’s politics, art market speculation by German 
buyers took off. The situation did not immediately become a clear abuse by 
Nazi authorities, thanks to the newly consolidated relationships between 
6 These early celebrations did not spare Italian art from the severe eye of the German 
commission responsible for the seizure of so-called degenerate art. In November 1937, 
works by Sironi, Montanari and Modigliani were taken away from the Nationalgalerie and 
amassed in some Köpenicker Straße warehouses. Later on, only Sironi’s Composition and 
Montanari’s Christ found their way back to the Berliner Museum. Modigliani’s Head of a 
woman was marked as “internationally valuable” and, in June 1939, it was sold at auction 
by Fischer Gallery in Lucerne, along with many other so-called ‘degenerate’ – but profit-
able – pieces (Scholz, Obenaus 2015).
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the two dictatorships. 
In June 1939 Hans Posse, director of the Dresda Galleries, was tasked 
with running the Linz Collection and its dedicated committee, the Son-
derauftrag Linz, on behalf of the Führer.7 From that moment until his death 
in 1942, Posse became the primary contact for every middle-men working 
to enrich Hitler’s collection. 
A key agent to Sonderauftrag Linz in Italy was Prince Philipp von Hes-
sen, married to King Vittorio Emanuele’s second daughter and SA com-
mander since 1925. The Prince provided Posse with extensive local support 
and made a bargaining chip out of Italy in order to be granted top brass 
approval.8 At the same time, Hermann Göring extensively relied on less 
ordinary types of transactions such as exchanges and donations prompted 
by personal and political interests. 
In mid-1937, the Prince of Hesse accompanied Sonderauftrag Linz’s 
representatives on their tour of Italy. Soon after, the Führer’s attention was 
drawn to the Roman statue dubbed Discobolo Lancellotti after its owner, 
Prince Filippo Lancellotti.9 Consequently, the owner asked the Ministry 
of National Education for permission to sell and transfer the piece to 
Germany. The Ministry turned down the request, as the statue was listed 
as unsellable under Law 364/1909 provisions on antiquities and works of 
art. Given the repeated and pressing demands, the Directorate General 
of Fine Arts set up a commission of three State officers,10 in line with the 
1909 Law. The commission’s report, as well as the final decision by the 
Supreme Council on Antiquities and Fine Arts, claimed that transferring 
the Discobolo represented a severe loss for Italy’s CH.11 On 7 May 1938, 
a note from Germany pointed out the Führer’s personal interest in the Di-
scobolo, asking for the export license to be approved.12 Once again, Bottai 
7 A real distinction did not seem to exist between art objects from Hilter’s private col-
lection and those meant to end up at the Linz Museum. In both cases acquired pieces were 
catalogued as Führer’s property (NARA, National Archives and Records Administration, 
Records of the Roberts Commission, 1943-6/Consolidated Interrogation Reports/C.I.R. # 4. 
Linz: Hitler’s Museum and Library).
8 NARA Records of the Roberts Commission, 1943-6/Consolidated Interrogation Reports/
C.I.R. # 4. Linz: Hitler’s Museum and Library.
9 Renowned marble Roman copy (II century A.D.) now displayed at the National Roman 
Museum of Palazzo Massimo in Rome.
10 Biagio Pace, Amedeo Maiuri and Carlo Anti. 
11 NARA Records Concerning the Central Collecting Points, “Ardelia Hall Collection”. Mu-
nich Central Collecting Point, 1945-51/Restitution Claim Records/Italy Claims - Paintings 
Claimed by Italy Still At The Munich Central Collecting Point, 9-14.
12 NARA Records Concerning the Central Collecting Points, “Ardelia Hall Collection”. Mu-
nich Central Collecting Point, 1945-51/Restitution Claim Records/Italy Claims - Paintings 
Claimed by Italy Still At The Munich Central Collecting Point, 15.
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personally refused to fulfil Germany’s request, yet on 3 June 1938, Musso-
lini ordered the Minister to approve the transfer of the statue to Germany.13 
Following this procedure, scores of masterpieces were moved from Italy 
to Germany as soon as the Führer or its Reichsmarschall claimed them. 
In 1941 a piece in a State collection got for the first time involved.14 On 
13 August, a note by Mussolini to the superintendent of Trent ordered that 
the ancient German altarpiece displayed at the City Museum of Vipiteno 
(Bolzano) be donated to Göring as a birthday gift.15 The following year, in 
January, the altarpiece was put on a train to Berlin and handed over to 
the Reichsmarschall.16 In June, Bottai complained to the Foreign Affairs 
minister Galeazzo Ciano about the duty-free privilege given to Germans 
while the Vipiteno negotiations were still undergoing. Ciano simply settled 
the issue by assuring that his Ministry would foot the bill. This eventually 
led to the Italian State charging itself while the Reich authorities had been 
totally exempted from any payment (Siviero 1984). While the Vipiteno 
affair was ongoing, Bottai asked Superintendencies for comprehensive 
lists of artworks recently transferred to Germany. Issued on 1 September 
1941, the order included a request for reports on the activity of German 
buyers within the Italian art market (Siviero 1984). A few days later, the 
head of Lazio’s Superintendency, Rinaldo de Rinaldis, reported the most 
frequently occurring name in his records to be the Prince of Hesse. Based 
on his statements, the Prince was not just personally in charge of franti-
cally purchasing works of art, he also happened to be particularly helpful 
whenever a German dealer needed an export permit granted despite Ital-
ian restrictions.
In November 1941, after having re-issued a ban on the transfer and 
export of State and other public cultural property (circular no. 170), Bot-
tai allowed for 34 crates filled with artwork to be transferred to Germany 
on behalf of Göring. The Reichsmarschall was in Florence one more time 
towards the end of 1942, rounding up scores of antique dealers and mid-
dlemen (Siviero 1984). Among them was Eugenio Ventura, who carried 
13 NARA Records Concerning the Central Collecting Points, “Ardelia Hall Collection”. Mu-
nich Central Collecting Point, 1945-51/Restitution Claim Records/Italy Claims - Paintings 
Claimed by Italy Still At The Munich Central Collecting Point, 26-27.
14 Even if the events in Italy after military occupation go beyond the scope of this work, 
it must nonetheless be noticed that a severe threat to State and public collections only ap-
peared towards the end of 1943, when Germany took control of the Fascist administration. 
15 The altarpiece, dated 1456-8, comprised four wooden panels by Hans Multscher. Two-
panels of unknown authorship belonging to the same period and school came with it (Siviero 
1950).
16 NARA Records Concerning the Central Collecting Points, “Ardelia Hall Collection”. 
Munich Central Collecting Point, 1945-51/Restitution Claim Records/Italy Claims - Cor-
respondence, 93-5. 
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out the exchange of several masterpieces with Göring’s agent, Walter 
Andreas Hofer. Eleven Renaissance paintings were thus handed over to 
the Germans in exchange for nine impressionist masterpieces belonging 
to the Nazi art hoard stored at the Jeu de Paume in Paris.17 In March 1943, 
Hofer returned again to Florence in order to complete the transaction and 
to grant Ventura with false statements meant to trick Italian authorities.18
2.2 Jewish-Owned Cultural Property
Up to 1943, the Fascist administration had been the only one responsible 
for carrying out racial persecution against individuals and their property 
on Italian soil. Provincial storage depots, banks, shipping companies 
and State agencies such as the Ente di gestione e liquidazione immo-
biliare (the agency for estate management and liquidation, specifically 
created to enact racial provisions against Jewish property)19 confiscated 
and retained huge amounts of private belongings. This happened due 
to three key acts, namely: tighter border controls following the RDL 
no. 1928/1938; limits to private ownership imposed on Jewish citizens 
by RDL no. 1728/1938; ownership restrictions for private citizens from 
enemy countries after the 1939 law of war (measure enacted by RDL 
no. 1415/1938). After the proclamation of the Manifesto in Verona on 30 
November and the increase in severity of the RSI’s racial policies, all Jew-
ish property became subject to seizure by Italian authorities. However, 
before the military occupation by the Reich, a relatively small number of 
artworks belonging to seized property had been transferred to Germany. 
A notable example of one of these was a privately-owned painting 
by Rubens seized by the Florence Superintendency. Despite the owner 
withdrawing her export request in order to have the artwork returned, 
the piece was sold to representatives of the Führer after negotiations 
taking place in 1941. Indeed, Italian local authorities had been actively 
involved from the start.
However, at the beginning of 1938 only a few actions had been taken 
against cultural property owned by Jewish citizens and communities, 
17 Among the 11 paintings exchanged by Ventura there were one Madonna by Paolo Ven-
eziano, Reni’s Atalanta and Ippomene and two Della Robbia’s. Göring gave away works by 
Cézanne and Degas, Van Gogh, Monet, Renoir and Sisley. 
18 NARA Records of the Roberts Commission, 1943-6/Consolidated Interrogation Reports/ 
C.I.R. # 2 - The Goering Collection.
19 Set up by R.D.L. 9 February 1939, no. 126, “Norme di attuazione ed integrazione delle 
disposizioni di cui all’art. 10 del R. decreto-legge 17 novembre 1938-XVII, n. 1728, relative ai 
limiti di proprietà immobiliare e di attività industriale e commerciale per i cittadini italiani 
di razza ebraica”. Repealed by R.D.L., 26, 20 January 1944.
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even if inventories of property belonging to victims of political and racial 
persecution had already been compiled. At that point in time, attention 
was mostly focused on attempts to export valuable art by those who were 
fleeing the country.20 For instance, in January 1939 the Directorate Gen-
eral of Antiquities and Fine Arts had to address a request by the Trent 
Superintendent and his colleagues regarding some high-value property 
seized after custom controls. A government note eventually assigned 
priority to the integrity of the national heritage, national law being thus 
aimed at enriching public collections. On 4 March 1939 (a few months 
before the Bottai Law was approved), the Ministry of National Educa-
tion issued circular no. 43 in order to address the massive outflow of 
foreign Jews from the end of the previous year. This prompted custom 
officers to cut down on the issuance of nulla osta and to overestimate 
the value of artworks, so as to prevent private owners from exporting 
their collections. Subsequently, on 13 September 1940 the Directorate 
General of Public Safety issued circular no. 63886 on the ban on trade in 
Jewish owned artworks and antiquities.21 Subsequently, a rebuilt Fascist 
Council of Ministers released a decree by Mussolini on the seizure of 
Jewish cultural property. The decree never officially entered into force. 
Nevertheless, the new minister of National Education Biggini imposed 
its implementation on all local authorities as early as December 1943.22 
Seizure of Jewish art and memorabilia by the Italian government even-
tually merged into a more comprehensive racial policy, which resulted 
in the confiscatory law of 4 January 1944. Consequently, in April, the 
Ministry appointed fine arts officers as the holders of seized artworks 
and other cultural property, thus aiming at preventing them from being 
lost, smuggled or scattered among officers’ parlours.23
20 NARA Records Concerning the Central Collecting Points, “Ardelia Hall Collection”. Mu-
nich Central Collecting Point, 1945-51/Restitution Claim Records/Italy Claims - Paintings 
Claimed by Italy Still At The Munich Central Collecting Point,17.
21 Commissione Anselmi 2001.
22 Circular 1 December 1943, no. 665, Requisizione delle opere d’arte di proprietà ebraica 
(Commissione Anselmi 2001).
23 Commissione Anselmi 2001.
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3 Effects on the Application of International Law  
on Cultural Restitution after 1945
At this point, it is interesting to consider how this misapplication of the 
Italian law on protection of cultural property spread, severely undermining 
the legal grounds on which to base any request for post-war international 
restitution. This assessment must take as its starting point those provisions 
stemming from the international regime on State responsibility and its 
primary codification, the 2001 ILC Draft Articles.24 These articles largely 
reflect the tentative formulations brought forward within the League of 
Nations, starting in the 1930s. For this reason, the principles behind the 
2001 Draft Articles are likely to apply here despite coming significantly 
after the events in question and despite their non-binding nature. Fur-
thermore, doctrine and practice regard some of these principles as part 
of general law (Focarelli 2012).
The 2001 Draft Articles definitively link the conduct of the State to that 
of its agents, whether they are persons or organs (arts. 4-11). This ap-
proach is based on judicial practice, which progressively tends to condemn 
individuals acting on the behalf of the State rather than States as politi-
cal entities. Part of the current doctrine has dubbed this practice “clever 
sanctions’, regarded by Picchio Forlati (2004, 126) as crucial in order to 
tie a State’s actions to its identifiable agents. International judgments 
following this orientation have often resulted in a more consistent and 
effective application of humanitarian law, owing to their ability to directly 
address the state élites and decision makers responsible for breaking the 
law (Zagato 2007, 150).
Questions now arise as to whether the Third Reich and its major repre-
sentatives (or people acting on their behalf) may be held responsible for 
committing internationally wrongful acts which would legitimate Italy’s 
claim for the restitution of art objects transferred to Germany prior to 
1943.25 This is to assess if it would be reasonable to consider the breach 
of Italian customs and cultural property law by Germany during peacetime 
as a breach of international law. In order for this to be the case, a rule 
of international law binding States to respect for other State’s domestic 
24 http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
(2017-12-15).
25 The 1954 Hague Convention and its (Second) 1999 Protocol also draw on principles of 
State responsibility. Nevertheless, they belong to international humanitarian law and for 
this reason their provisions only apply in the event of use of armed force and military oc-
cupation (see 1954 Hague Convention, art. 18 and 1999 Protocol, art. 3).
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law should have been in place at that time.26 However, no such rule exists 
nor existed at the time, other than that requiring respect for State sover-
eignty, as codified in the San Francisco Charter of the UN of 26 June 1945 
(and even earlier, in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights 
and Duties of States). Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter can be interpreted as 
a commitment not to interfere with each State’s internal sovereignty and 
independence, thus regarding the need to abide by its internal law as a 
rule within the international community. This argument nonetheless fades 
away under the long-established principles of State jurisdictional immunity 
to be granted to each foreign entity.27
Despite these considerations, claims for the return of artworks removed 
before the military occupation by the Nazi forces might well have relied 
on the Bottai Law’s provisions and their enactment. However, the unlaw-
ful transfer of Italian cultural property to Germany before 1943 must be 
regarded as a case of collusion, rather than a direct violation of State 
sovereignty. Indeed, Italian authorities at no point had been firmly invok-
ing Law no. 1089 to ward off Nazi pressing requests for high-value and 
renowned pieces of art, but rather complied with them. 
Irrespective of its own political responsibility, at the end of the war Italy 
filed several claims to the US AMG in Germany. Requests concerned not 
only the cultural property seized and ransacked on national soil following 
the Wehrmacht’s invasion, but also comprised property sold and trans-
ferred between 1937 and the downfall of Mussolini’s government. Based 
on previous considerations, US military authorities could have reasonably 
turned down Italy’s claims for artworks transferred to Germany before 
1943. Indeed, the Peace Treaty between Italy and the Allies (1947) entitled 
the former – art. 77(2) – to a right of restitution only for property seized 
under duress by the Germans after September 1943. Despite this provi-
sion, US policies on the matter were far from clear, not least because of 
its plans for political endorsement within the newborn Italian Republic. At 
the same time, post-war political turmoil represented a unique opportunity 
for Italy to firmly uphold its demands, despite its controversial past. 
Interestingly enough, both the first parliamentary elections of the Italian 
republic and the sudden order from Washington for the return to “claim-
ing governments” of all cultural property transferred by Nazi authorities 
against domestic law – not necessarily under military occupation or po-
26 1970 UNESCO Convention and its art. 3 on the respect of each State Party’s provisions 
for the protection of cultural property do not apply to events preceding the Convention itself.
27 Object of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and already part of 
customary international law (Focarelli 2012).
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litical collusion – were dated April 1948.28 From 1945 onwards, no other 
US-AMG directive would ever endorse such a position.29 Years later, wors-
ened international relations and brewing campaigns of suspicion put an 
end to this season of restitution. This is testified by the diplomatic uproar 
in 1948 following the restitution to Italy of several artworks, which were 
among those transferred to Germany after 1937. As a result of reciprocal 
protests and accusations among Italy, US and Germany, US occupation 
authorities removed themselves from ongoing negotiations with the Ital-
ian representatives for the return of the remaining cultural property held 
in Germany. This led to progressively leaving the issue of international 
restitution of artworks to the competent German authorities. German of-
ficers, who initially complied with Italy’s requests, soon found themselves 
eager to act based on diplomatic (thus unpredictable) grounds rather than 
building on the previous Allies’ policy on war reparations. As for the Ital-
ian government, the 1950’s and 60’s saw no effective political initiatives 
towards the return of what was still left abroad.
4 Final Remarks. Demystifying Law no. 1089
From the 1950s onward, expert and the public opinion did not seem overly 
keen on stressing the political paradox of the historical premises and pro-
visions of Law no. 1089. Conversely, current contributions display rather 
positive approaches toward the 1939 measure (Tamiozzo 2009). This may 
be owing to a tendency to not fully distinguish between the achievements 
of this law and those generally obtained by Bottai’s general reform of the 
fine arts administration (Cosi 2008). More often than not, this approach 
disregards the clear raison d’être of the single law, losing the opportunity 
for a more comprehensive historical review. The Minister of National Educa-
tion’s own words on the matter give nonetheless good hints in these regards. 
On 26 March 1938, Bottai officially commented before the Senate on 
his Ministry’s annual report, ushering in his legal reforms to the cultural 
sector. Unsurprisingly, the Fascist minister chose strongly provocative 
wording, calling for a much-anticipated transition from a protectionist and 
28 NARA Records Concerning the Central Collecting Points, “Ardelia Hall Collection”. 
Munich Central Collecting Point, 1945-51/Restitution Claim Records/Italy Claims - Cor-
respondence, 36.
29 The issue had been extensively considered on one occasion only, i.e. in the report sub-
mitted by the Director of the MFAA Italian branch, Norman T. Newton, on 5 January 1946 
with the title Works of art exported to Germany by Fascists (NARA Records Concerning the 
Central Collecting Points, “Ardelia Hall Collection”. Munich Central Collecting Point, 1945-
51/Restitution Claim Records/Italy Claims - Paintings Claimed by Italy Still at The Munich 
Central Collecting Point, 25-35).
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conservative, even passive, safeguard30 (in place since Law no. 364/1909) 
to a more exploitable one.31 This clearly matched a much more flexible 
application of contemporary rules on the transfer and sale of artworks. In-
deed, even if Bottai’s statements were indisputably in favour of protecting 
CH, boosting the economy through a strengthened art market appeared 
more than ever to be in harmony with new (but not further specified) na-
tional demands (Bottai 1940).32 Indeed, a few months after addressing the 
Senate, Bottai allowed Discobolo Lancellotti to be transferred to Germany, 
in an open clash with the government Commission of Fine Art. 
Moreover, Bottai repeatedly claimed that protectionism on the art mar-
ket was a consequence of the 1909 Law. In a speech before all Italian 
superintendents gathered in Rome in July 1938, he could not help but call 
this same law obsolete. Ultra-liberalism and lack of proper inventories in 
the wake of Italy’s unification had been common justifications for the rigor 
of Law 364/1909. Consequently, the minister had assured his audience the 
inventory of works of art would now be complete enough for the govern-
ment to loosen legal bonds still in place.33 This also meant he planned on 
limiting the more severe provisions on transfer and sale to those cases 
implying extreme cultural losses for the national CH. For too long the art 
market had been suffering tough limitations and heavy taxation,34 the min-
ister maintained (Bottai 1940). Eventually, these government commitments 
were to result in draft articles on the safeguard of objects of artistic and 
historical relevance, which would later become Law 1089/1939. 
In this regard, particularly noteworthy in the context of racial persecu-
tion and abuse of powers of the 1930’s is the extension of the power of 
seizure, previously limited to situations where the integrity of the artwork 
was at risk, to more generic reasons of “public interest” (a wording that 
the 2004 Urbani Code contains unchanged). More in detail, this public 
interest included the need for restoration as well as the rather ambiguous 
30 “[T]utela difensiva e conservatrice, di carattere passivo” (Bottai 1940).
31 “[T]utela manovrata” (Bottai 1940).
32 “[N]uove esigenze nazionali” (Bottai 1940).
33 In his 1956 Commentary on Law 1089/1939, the Calabria Superintendence of Antiqui-
ties officer Placido Olindo Geraci claimed that in the late 50s an exhaustive inventory of 
cultural property belonging to State and public bodies was not yet in place. The situation 
became particularly serious when it came to major national museums and this affected 
local and city museums alike. Collections were thus exposed to great threats, which grew 
more serious during and soon after wartime: “[I]l censimento esatto di tutte le cose di pro-
prietà dello Stato e degli enti diversi da esso lascia molto a desiderare e gli ultimi eventi 
bellici hanno peggiorato la situazione: persino Musei nazionali importanti mancano ancora 
d’inventari aggiornati e completi, senza dire di quelli provinciali e civici, ciò che è causa di 
gravissimi abusi” (Geraci 1956).
34 “[T]roppo rigide limitazioni e troppo forti gravami fiscali” (Bottai 1940).
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‘enrichment’ of national cultural assets (see Law 1089/39, art. 54). Ad-
ditionally, auction house regulations had been deliberately excluded (and 
so are nowadays), so as not to hinder market growth. This growth was 
expected to open the opportunity for State and other public artworks to 
be either sold or swapped. Indeed, Bottai regarded these unprecedented 
exceptions to the long-standing rule of inalienability of State property as 
a means of stimulating the national economy (Bottai 1940).35
Additionally, compared to previous measures on the fine arts sector 
(namely, Nasi Law of 1902 and Rosadi Law of 1909), it could be argued 
that the achievement of Bottai’s Law was the reorganisation of principles 
that had already been in place for at least thirty years. Yet, these same 
principles did not seem to urge initiatives such as a new law on the verge 
of a global conflict, amidst racial and political repression. This lack of ur-
gency also lies in the fact that no regulatory acts whatsoever eventually 
implemented Bottai Law’s provisions. Indeed, the 1913 regulations for the 
application of Rosadi Law no. 364/1909 remained fully applicable, as they 
still are nowadays (based on Urbani Code’s art. 130). In this regard, when 
Placido Olindo Geraci put forth his tentative amendment to Law 1089, 
he underlined the law’s broad misapplication and ineffectiveness (due to 
“several unpredictable and unlucky events”36). For Geraci, an overall lack 
of any judgements relying on Law 1089 was even more regrettable given 
what he regarded as a massive breach of its provisions (Geraci 1949).
In summary, while Bottai issued Law 1089 so as to tailor the art market 
to political interests and loyalties, its provisions were nonetheless misap-
plied in order to justify a drastic restriction on the transfer of cultural 
property belonging to persecuted individuals. Ironically, the only excep-
tion to these strict border controls were given to those pieces claimed by 
the Nazis, State-and public-owned artworks included. Therefore, Law no. 
1089 of 1 June 1939 appears as a key element in the overall 1930s/40s 
fascist policy of malpractice and abuse, rather than a game-changer in the 
development of the Italian law on cultural protection. Indeed, this leaves us 
with doubts as to whether Law 1089/1939 was ever meant to be. Despite 
this, the current legal regime on CH (as well as higher education) in Italy 
appears to have excessively relied on this Fascist construct, rather than 
building on previous and more praiseworthy legislation. 
35 Notably, the draft articles allowed for Italian cultural institutions to exchange works 
of art only if a foreign counterpart was concerned. The requirement was eventually with-
drawn from the final version of Law 1089. However, questions on to why the original version 
of art. 25 bores such reference remain. As Grisolia points out, doubts also arise as to the 
reasons for exempting the exchange of artworks from preservation and public accessibil-
ity requirements, which characterise any other kind of property transfer within Law 1089 
(Grisolia 1939).
36 “Una serie di imprevedibili e malaugurate circostanze” (Geraci 1949).
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